I wrote this essay the week after the Defence Secretary revealed that the Royal Navy had spent over a month tracking three Russian submarines in the North Atlantic, specifically designed to survey undersea infrastructure in peacetime and sabotage it in conflict. This news finally pushed me to write something I had been contemplating since the Nord Stream pipelines were blown up in 2022.
The UK depends on approximately 62 fibre-optic cables, six gas pipelines and ten electricity interconnectors running along the seabed to connect it with the rest of the world. More than 95% of our internet traffic, three-quarters of our gas, and a significant share of our electricity all arrive this way. This essay maps that infrastructure, examines a series of real incidents where cables and pipelines have been damaged or threatened, considers how drone warfare is changing the threat picture, and asks what the UK government is doing in response.
My biggest concern, having done the research, is not the threat itself but the gap between the scale of the risk and the seriousness of the response. The UK owns no cable repair ships. It has one dedicated ocean surveillance vessel. Churchill worried about U-boats. The modern equivalent is already here, and we are not yet taking it seriously enough.